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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-4240 
______________ 
 
KWAN HO WU, 
a/k/a Shui-Hui Wei, 
a/k/a Kuan He Wu, 
a/k/a Ho Kwan Wu, 
             Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                      Respondent 
______________ 
 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A071-873-513) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. William Strasser 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 8, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kwan Ho Wu (“Wu”), a native and citizen of China from the Zhejiang province, 
petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying 
his supplemental motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  Because the BIA acted 
within its discretion in denying Wu’s motion, we will deny his petition. 
I 
 In 1992, Wu was detained and charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C) for attempting to fraudulently obtain admission into the United States 
and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for attempting to enter the United States without a 
properly issued visa.  Wu filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that he would be 
persecuted for his past activities as a student demonstrator and involvement in a “pro-
democracy movement.”  AR 1896.  In 1994, the IJ denied Wu’s application and ordered 
Wu’s removal from the United States, finding that there was not “sufficient, credible 
evidence . . . that [Wu] was persecuted before he left China or that it is likely that he has 
a well-founded fear of persecution . . . if he were to return to China.”  AR 1735.  In 2000, 
the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Wu’s appeal, finding that Wu “has not 
established that he was persecuted in China” or that “he has a well-founded fear of 
persecution.”  AR 1721–22.   
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 In 2007, Wu filed a motion to reopen, claiming that his attorney failed to inform 
him that the BIA dismissed his appeal and failed to appeal the BIA’s decision.  The BIA 
denied Wu’s motion because he failed to make the required showing “that he acted with 
reasonable diligence” in maintaining contact with his former counsel following his appeal 
of the IJ’s 1994 decision.  AR 1695.   
 In 2010, Wu filed his second motion to reopen on the basis of changed country 
conditions in China.  Wu, who at that time had four U.S.-born children, specifically cited 
China’s family planning policies, which limit the number of children a person may have 
and penalize those who exceed the limit through fines, forced abortions, and forced 
sterilizations.  Wu presented “voluminous” documents including affidavits from other 
Chinese nationals “who have allegedly experienced sterilizations,” a 2009 article from 
the Law Library of Congress, an excerpt of the “2009 Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China [CECC] Annual Report” (the “2009 CECC Report”), and “various 
other reports from 2007 through 2009.”  AR 4.1  The BIA denied Wu’s second motion to 
reopen as untimely and because Wu failed to present authenticated evidence that 
demonstrated changed country conditions.  Specifically, the BIA noted that the birth of 
Wu’s four children constituted a change in personal circumstances, not “a change in 
                                                 
1 “The CECC is a body created by Congress with the legislative mandate to 
monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China.  It is composed of 
nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior 
Administration officials appointed by the President.  The CECC reports are pertinent 
official publications of the federal government.”  Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 277 
n.15 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
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circumstances or country conditions ‘arising in the country of nationality’ so as to create 
an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.”  AR 1338 (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)).  The BIA also noted Wu’s failure to “demonstrate how 
conditions in China have changed since his last motion [to reopen] in 2007,” when Wu 
and his spouse already “had multiple children.”  AR 1338.   
 One month later, Wu filed his third motion to reopen, again claiming changed 
country conditions in China based on its family planning policies.  As with his second 
motion to reopen, Wu offered numerous documents, including “a 2001 administrative 
decision of the Qi Du Township Education Department,” a research article from 2007, 
“several media reports dated between 2007 and 2009,” various 2008 announcements from 
neighborhood and township committees in China, a portion of the 2009 CECC Report, 
and additional congressional and academic research reports.  AR 4.  The BIA denied 
Wu’s third motion to reopen, finding that “[m]ost of the evidence is not new nor 
previously unavailable” and that Wu “has not demonstrated that he would be subjected to 
economic harm amounting to persecution” were he to return to China.  AR 974–75.  In 
2012, we vacated the BIA’s denials of Wu’s second and third motions to reopen and 
remanded to the BIA to determine whether country conditions in China had changed 
since Wu’s 1994 hearing before the IJ, rather than whether they had changed since the 
date of Wu’s first motion to reopen as the BIA had done.  Wu v. Att’y Gen., 461 F. 
App’x 184 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential).     
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 After remand, Wu filed “Supplementary Materials,” AR 889, and “Supplementary 
Submissions,” AR 842, containing additional documents, including letters purportedly 
from “the Village Committee of QianSha Village” and “the Family Planning Office of 
Wenzhou City,” AR 845, 847, two 2010 U.S. State Department communications 
“regarding [United Nations Population Fund] funding and China’s population control” 
and “regarding population control [policies] in Fujian province,” two 2011 articles 
“regarding birth control policies in China,” and Wu’s 2011 letter to “the U.S. State 
Department Appeals Review Panel.”  AR 5.  The BIA considered Wu’s prior evidence 
along with these new documents and, in a decision dated February 28, 2013, denied Wu’s 
second and third motions to reopen. 
 Wu moved for reconsideration of the BIA’s February 28, 2013 decision.  In 
support of his motion, Wu submitted “complete versions of previously filed partial U.S. 
State Department and Congressional reports, and a statement from [Wu’s] attorney 
regarding his attempts to authenticate his previously proffered documentation.”  AR 5.  
The BIA denied Wu’s motion for reconsideration, determining that he “fail[ed] to 
indicate any error in law or fact” in its February 28, 2013 decision.  AR 160.  Wu 
appealed, and we granted the Government’s unopposed motion to remand to the BIA for 
further consideration of certain documents Wu had submitted in his prior motions but that 
“were not specifically addressed in the BIA’s decision,” namely “documents from the 
Chinese government’s website that [Wu] claimed were self-authenticating” and 
“documents from [his] home province of Zhejiang.”  AR 155.        
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 On remand, Wu also filed his fourth “supplementary” motion to reopen (the 
“Supplemental Motion”), AR 14, which included an affidavit of Myron Cohen, an 
anthropology professor at Columbia University who Wu asserts “has focused his 
academic research on the study of Chinese culture and family,” AR 15, documents from 
Chinese government websites concerning family planning policies in Wu’s home 
province of Zhejiang, and several Internet news articles concerning forced abortions in 
Zhejiang.      
 The BIA denied Wu’s Supplemental Motion (the “Final Decision”).  The Final 
Decision first addressed the documents from the Chinese government websites and found 
they did not “demonstrate a change in country conditions in Zhejiang Province since 
1994” concerning China’s family planning policies or its enforcement of those policies.  
AR 6.  The BIA also re-reviewed various documents from the Chinese government 
website that Wu had provided with his second motion to reopen and found that they “do 
not announce or describe a significant or non-incremental change in the family planning 
laws or enforcement of such laws.”  AR 8.  The BIA also reviewed “a third set of 
documents from Zhejiang province” that Wu provided following remand and similarly 
found that they did not indicate “that sterilization would be forcibly imposed or that harm 
amounting to persecution would be otherwise inflicted on the father of U.S. born children 
who returns to China.”  AR 9.  The BIA concluded that these documents, taken together, 
“[a]t most . . . demonstrate that pressures to enforce the family planning policy vary from 
locale to locale and fluctuate incrementally from time to time.”  AR 9.  
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 The Final Decision then addressed photocopies of unsigned letters Wu claimed 
were prepared by the Village Committee of QianSha Village and the Family Planning 
Office of Wenzhou City.2  The BIA found “no basis to conclude that these letters are 
authentic,” AR 9, and, even assuming their authenticity, determined that they did “not 
indicate a shift or change in policy demonstrating a change in family planning 
enforcement” given that “[s]imilar letters have been provided for many years,” AR 10.    
 The Final Decision next considered Professor Cohen’s affidavit, in which he 
opined that “officials in Zhejiang offer cash rewards to informants who report on family 
planning violations,” which he suggested showed “a high probability” that Wu would be 
subject to forced sterilization.  AR 10.  Professor Cohen also represented that “present 
day enforcement [of China’s family planning policies] has become significantly harsher 
than in 1994.”  AR 10–11.  The BIA gave “minimal weight” to Professor Cohen’s 
opinions because they were “based primarily on materials provided by [Wu’s] attorney” 
                                                 
2 The first letter, purportedly from the “Village Committee of QianSha Village, 
QiDu Street, LuCheng District, Wenzhou City” to “Villagers YouXiong WU” and 
“VengYing HUANG,” describes QianSha Village’s policy that “a couple who have 
reached their marriageable age can only give birth to one child” and that “after birth of 
one child, one must have IUD [sic] inserted, and those who gave birth to two children 
must be sterilized,” and advises the letter’s recipients that YouXiong WU’s son (who we 
assume ostensibly violated these policies by having children while living in the United 
States) “is subject to sterilization unless he becomes a United States citizen or a 
permanent resident.”  AR 847–48.  The second letter, purportedly from the “Family 
Planning Office[,] QiDu Street, LuCheng District, Wenzhou City” to the same recipients, 
similarly explains that YouXiong WU’s son “is still under the regulation of family 
planning office [sic] of QiDu Street if he returned back to China” and “violated the 
family planning policy by giving birth to four children” while in the United States.  AR 
852–53.    
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and because Cohen lacked “any personal or anecdotal knowledge of instances of forced 
sterilization” or increased enforcement of China’s family planning policies.  AR 11.   
 Concluding that Wu failed to carry his burden “of demonstrating changed country 
conditions that would justify reopening these proceedings” or establish “a prima facie 
case of eligibility for asylum,”3 the BIA denied Wu’s Supplemental Motion.  Wu 
petitions for review of the BIA’s Final Decision.       
II 
 The BIA had jurisdiction to review Wu’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the denial of a 
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, “regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s 
request for relief.”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  We thus give 
“broad deference” to the BIA’s ultimate decision, Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 
409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), which we will disturb only if it is 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).4   
                                                 
3 The BIA also observed that Wu had not “provided convincing evidence that a 
father of multiple children born in the United States who returns to China would be 
forcibly sterilized” or “shown that [economic] sanctions [he may face] would approach 
the severity required to constitute persecution,” given that Wu’s application for 
cancellation of removal “indicates that he had $1,400,000.00 in assets and earned 
$6,000.00 a week.”  AR 12–13.   
 4 “The BIA may deny a motion to reopen if it determines that (1) the alien has not 
established a prima facie case for the relief sought; (2) the alien has not introduced 
previously unavailable, material evidence; or (3) in the case of discretionary relief (such 
as asylum), the alien would not be entitled to relief even if the motion was granted.”  
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III 
 Wu’s Supplemental Motion to reopen was both time- and number-barred.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (providing that an applicant generally may file only one 
motion to reopen and must do so “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal”).  Moreover, as explained herein, Wu has not met the 
exception that permits an untimely motion as he has not presented previously unavailable 
material evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.”  
Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 To determine if the BIA abused its discretion in denying Wu’s Supplemental 
Motion, “we must determine if the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence and 
arguments [Wu] presented.”  Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Although the BIA need not “parse or refute on the record each individual . . . piece of 
evidence offered by the petitioner,” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), it “must provide an indication that it considered 
such evidence, and if the evidence is rejected, an explanation as to why it was rejected,” 
Zhu, 744 F.3d at 272.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Where the BIA concludes that a petitioner has not established a prima facie 
case to reopen proceedings, we review the BIA’s findings of fact under the substantial 
evidence standard.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under this 
standard, we must uphold the BIA’s factual findings “unless the evidence not only 
supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–
84 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 Here, Wu contends primarily that: (i) the BIA failed to consider the entire record, 
including documents from Wu’s prior motions to reopen such as the 2009 CECC Report; 
(ii) even if the Final Decision incorporated the BIA’s consideration of these documents 
from its previous February 28, 2013 decision, neither decision adequately considers these 
documents; and (iii) the BIA improperly discounted the evidentiary weight of certain 
documents, namely letters from various Chinese government entities and the affidavit of 
Professor Cohen.  Although we agree that the BIA could have more thoroughly discussed 
certain of Wu’s submissions, the Final Decision reflects that the BIA meaningfully 
considered Wu’s voluminous documentary evidence such that it acted within its 
discretion in denying his Supplemental Motion.   
 The Final Decision explains that the BIA considered the documents “filed with 
each [of Wu’s] motion[s] and appeal,” including the documents “identified in the 
government’s motion to remand” and in Wu’s previous motions to reopen to determine 
“whether the totality of the evidence submitted since the first motion to reopen 
establishes changed country conditions.”  AR 3.  The Final Decision proceeds to discuss 
numerous documents Wu included in his various motions to reopen, and after “hav[ing] 
thoroughly reviewed” them, found them insufficient to establish “a change in country 
conditions since 1994” concerning the policies governing “Chinese citizens with children 
born outside of the United States” such as Wu.  AR 9–11.5  See generally Liu v. Att’y 
                                                 
5 Although we agree with Wu that the BIA’s February 28, 2013 decision 
erroneously identifies Fujian Province as Wu’s home province in one place, the Final 
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Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that an applicant “citing changed 
personal circumstances” still must “demonstrate[] that there are changed country 
conditions”). 
 For example, the Final Decision reflects the BIA’s examination of the Chinese 
government documents Wu included with his first and second motions to reopen.  It 
provides “an explanation as to why [these documents] w[ere] rejected,” Zhu, 744 F.3d at 
272, and contains “more than cursory, summary or conclusory statements” such that we 
can “discern [the BIA’s] reasons for declining” Wu’s requested relief, Zheng, 549 F.3d at 
268 (internal quotation marks omitted).6  As to documents purportedly from the Chinese 
government website, the BIA explained that they did not “directly address the treatment 
of Chinese nationals returning to China with [U.S.-born] children” or government 
enforcement of family planning policies in Zhejiang, Wu’s home province.  AR 6–7.  
Likewise, the BIA noted that the “Family Planning Regulations of Zhejiang Province” 
that Wu included with his first motion to reopen “did not directly address the treatment of 
Chinese nationals returning to China with children born in the United States” or 
otherwise “refer to forced abortion or forced sterilization for violations of the family 
planning policy.”  AR 7.  Furthermore, the Final Decision shows that the BIA thoroughly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Decision explicitly examined whether Wu carried his “burden to demonstrate that the 
current situation for enforcement of family planning policy in Zhejiang province today 
has sufficiently changed since 1994 to justify reopening.”  AR 9.   
6 The Final Decision also lists the “additional” Chinese Government documents 
Wu included with his second motion concerning family planning policies in Zhejiang 
Province, and found them unpersuasive for describing family planning enforcement 
efforts “in place since the late 1980s.”  AR 8.   
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reviewed the “third set of documents from Zhejiang province” that Wu submitted 
following remand, AR 8, assumed their authenticity, discussed one such document in 
substantial detail, and found they did not reflect a “change in country conditions [in 
Zhejiang province] since 1994.”  AR 9.   
 Thus, this is not a case in which the BIA “fail[ed] to discuss most of the 
evidentiary record” or “did little more than quote passages from its earlier decision . . .  
without identifying—let alone discussing—the various statements contained in the record 
before it.”  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268–69 (vacating denial of motion to reopen where the 
BIA “did not mention” numerous documents included in the petitioner’s motion).  
Rather, the BIA here fulfilled its obligation under Zhu to consider relevant and authentic 
evidence.       
 The BIA’s failure to thoroughly discuss or credit the 2009 CECC Report does not 
undermine this conclusion.7  As we noted in Zhu, CECC reports “alone” are not 
“necessarily sufficient to demonstrate a material change in country conditions.”  Zhu, 744 
F.3d at 278 n.21.  Even had the Final Decision specifically discussed Wu’s excerpted 
2009 CECC Report, the BIA could have reasonably discounted its probative value as it 
predominantly describes activities in provinces other than Zhejiang and only discusses 
                                                 
7 We remind the BIA that CECC reports may “materially bear” on certain claims 
for asylum premised on changed country conditions and, under those circumstances, may 
merit explicit consideration.  Zhu, 744 F.3d at 278; see also Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d 
171, 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The BIA’s failure to account for the reports of the CECC is 
not unprecedented.”); Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The Board’s 
ongoing refusal to respond meaningfully to [CECC Reports] is difficult to understand.”). 
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female-specific enforcement mechanisms.8  Coupled with the Final Decision’s “reasoned 
consideration” of the bulk of Wu’s submissions and “adequate findings” about those 
submissions, Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted), a reasonable 
adjudicator would not be “compelled” to reach a contrary conclusion regarding the 
country conditions based on the CECC Report, Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 237 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 Finally, the BIA acted within its discretion in finding Wu’s letters from the Village 
Committee of QianSha Village and the Family Planning Office of Wenzhou City 
insufficiently authenticated.  The BIA “can reject evidence that it finds to be 
untrustworthy or irrelevant.”  Zhu, 744 F.3d at 273–74.  Here, the BIA found Wu’s letters 
inauthentic because Wu “submitted photocopies rather than original letters, the letters 
lack signatures, and no author is identified in either letter.”  AR 9.  Wu has provided no 
basis to refute these conclusions.  Because the BIA “is not required to conduct an 
independent examination of a document where the proponent has provided no basis from 
which it could find the document is authentic,” Zhu, 744 F.3d at 274, we reject Wu’s 
contention that the BIA improperly “discount[ed] material evidence from [his] 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., AR 1571 (“[C]entral and local authorities continued to interfere with 
and control the reproductive lives of Chinese women . . . .”), id. at 1572 (reporting that 
“additional fines are imposed on women who resist official efforts to ‘implement 
remedial measures’ such as abortion”), id. at 1573 (finding that “‘termination of 
pregnancy’ is explicitly required in eight provinces,” and listing “10 other provinces” 
wherein officials “are authorized to take ‘remedial measures’ to deal with ‘out-of-plan’ 
pregnancies,” none of which are Zhejiang Province).   
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hometown” due to its lack of authenticity, Pet’r Br. 36.9  Thus, the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Wu’s Supplemental Motion.10   
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition. 
                                                 
9 We also reject Wu’s contention that the BIA erred by affording “minimal 
weight” to Professor Cohen’s affidavit.  Pet’r Br. 43.  The Final Decision contains 
multiple paragraphs reflecting the BIA’s consideration of Professor Cohen’s opinions and 
explaining why it gave the opinion little weight.  The BIA discounted them in part 
because Professor Cohen did not indicate “that he has researched or written on issues of 
Chinese family planning law or policy prior to his involvement in his case.”  AR 11.  
This reflects the BIA’s view that he lacked a particular expertise in the relevant issues.  
This alone is a sufficient reason to afford the opinion little weight.  The BIA also 
discounted Professor Cohen’s views because he offered no “personal knowledge to 
support his finding that there has been increased enforcement of the family planning 
policy . . . as to returnees from the United States with United States children.”  AR 11.  
Even if we disagreed with the BIA’s decision to discount his opinions based on a lack of 
personal knowledge, as previously stated, the BIA gave “reasoned consideration” to 
Cohen’s opinion and, under our highly deferential standard of review, we defer to the 
weight the BIA gave to the opinion.  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).     
10 We likewise conclude that the BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that 
Wu failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie showing of eligibility for 
asylum.   
